Abstract-The aim of privacy-preserving data mining is to construct highly accurate predictive models while not disclosing privacy information. Aggregation functions, such as sum and count are often used to pre-process the data prior to applying data mining techniques to relational databases. Often, it is implicitly assumed that the aggregated (or summarized) data are less likely to lead to privacy violations during data mining. This paper investigates this claim, within the relational database domain. We introduce the PBIRD (Privacy Breach Investigation in Relational Databases) methodology. Our experimental results show that aggregation potentially introduces new privacy violations. That is, potentially harmful attributes obtained with aggregation are often different from the ones obtained from nonaggregated databases. This indicates that, even when privacy is enforced on non-aggregated data, it is not automatically enforced on the corresponding aggregated data. Consequently, special care should be taken during model building in order to fully enforce privacy when the data are aggregated.
Introduction
With the rapid increase in the number of relational databases available for data mining, privacy preservation is becoming an acute problem. Indeed, data mining tasks such as association analysis, unsupervised learning and classification, may lead to privacy leaks and unwanted disclosures [24] .
Most data mining techniques are inherently propositional which means their application is restricted to a single table or flat file. Consequently, it is not possible to apply them directly to relational databases. Rather, the tables or relations in the database need to be joined together, by means of foreign keys, prior to data mining. In the case of one-to-many or many-tomany relationships, this join involves aggregation. For example, in a transactional database a single Customer may have many Payments, and when we want to join these two tables together, the payments are typically counted and summed.
Aggregation functions such as maximum, minimum, average, and standard deviation are used in order to summarize the information stored in multiple records into a single record. These functions take a set of tuples as input, and summarize the properties of the set into a single value. During this process, new features (attributes) are generated as a result of the summarizing exercise. As such, aggregation changes the set of attributes and the number of records in the resulting table/relation.
Although aggregation functions are extensively used during relational databases mining, studying their direct (and possibly negative) impact on the privacy of a relational database has received less attention. In this paper, we study the impact of applying aggregation functions on the privacy of a relational database, during supervised learning, or classification.
We introduce a new approach, the Privacy Breach Investigation in Relational Databases (PBIRD) algorithm, which allows one to evaluate the impact of aggregation on the privacy of a relational database. This algorithm consists of three main steps. Firstly, it constructs different views from various subsets of the data, with and without aggregation. Secondly, it identifies the selected features associated with each view by using a feature selection algorithm: in our case CFS [1] . Finally, it determines the logical relationship in between the selected features to study the impact on privacy disclosure.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the background. In Section 3, we introduce the PBIRD algorithm. This is followed, in Section 4, by the experimental results and their analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and presents some future research directions.
Background
The goal of privacy-preserving data mining [2] is to develop algorithms to modify the original dataset so that the privacy of confidential information remains preserved without impacting the validity of the data mining exercise [3] . Several approaches have been considered, as discussed next.
Privacy Preserving Data Mining Techniques
There are three major categories of privacy preserving data mining, namely heuristic-based techniques, cryptographybased techniques, and reconstruction-based methods [4] . Heuristic-based techniques are mainly used in centralized environments. These techniques hide sensitive information by perturbing the data using a probability density function. Heuristic-based approaches hide both raw and aggregated data using different hiding techniques such as k-anonymization [5; 6] , data swapping, generalization, sampling, and noise addition. Cryptography-based techniques are problemspecific. They are applicable to distributed data in scenarios where more than one party is involved in order to securely and collaboratively perform a calculation based on their private inputs. Unfortunately, they do not protect the results of the calculation and the privacy leakage is solely prevented at the level of the calculation [7] . Reconstruction-based techniques perturb the data and reconstruct the distribution at an aggregate level. They may be applied on both centralized and distributed data.
Privacy in Multi-Relational Database Mining
Although the above-mentioned techniques are commonly used to preserve the privacy of a dataset, they may not be sufficient in order to preserve the privacy in multi-relational databases. Privacy preserving in multi-relational database mining is a relatively recent field of study. To achieve k-anonymity in multi-relational databases, Nergiz et al. [8] introduced a privacy model called Multi-Relational k-anonymity (MultiR k-anonymity). It extends the k-anonymity from a single relation to multiple relations and shows that the previous kanonymity models fail to protect the privacy and cause reduction of utility of the data in multiple relations. Another work in [9] introduces a data mining framework in order to identify potential privacy leakage in a multi-relational database. Based on this framework, it is possible to detect data leakage using different semi-supervised learning techniques such as K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN). This approach defines a new direction for semi-supervised learning called Hyperclique Pattern-based Semi-supervised Learning (HPSL) which differs from the traditional semi-supervised learning approaches by the fact that, instead of considering the similarity of a pair of objects, it considers the similarity in between a set of objects. It has been shown that both HPSL and the KNN-based techniques may potentially compromise the privacy of relational databases [9] .
The very nature of multi-relational databases introduces new challenges for privacy preservation. For instance, in relational databases, it is possible to link a set of seemingly harmless attributes across multiple relations to confidential information [10] . Therefore, in these databases, anonymization of the private information, alone, does not guarantee privacy preservation. The work in [10] further shows that distorting or eliminating the confidential attribute(s) may not be sufficient to prevent data leakage, since values may be inferred based on prior insider knowledge. Aggregation functions, as introduced next, further complicate the process.
Aggregation Functions
Aggregation is considered an important feature of database query languages. Recall that, in relational databases, data are contained in many tables and, consequently, one has to deal with the non-determinacy of one-to-many relationships. Aggregation functions are needed to handle this situation [11] . Given a set of records, it is thus possible to compute a feature (attribute) which summarizes it.
The role of aggregation operators in data privacy has been recently studied [12] in the context of two privacy protection techniques, namely micro-aggregation and disclosure risk measures. In both cases, aggregation plays a positive role in achieving the overall goal of privacy preservation.
Aggregation functions eliminate redundancy, hide unnecessary details, and reduce the size (the number of records) of the resulting dataset. However, these functions result in an increase in the number of attributes specially when applied on nominal attributes with high cardinality. Aggregation functions also result in a loss of information due to summarization, and may not be suitable for all attributes in a given relation [13; 14] .
Furthermore, studying the (possibly negative) impact of aggregation on the privacy of relational databases during supervised learning or classification has been mostly overlooked. This paper addresses this issue by introducing the PBIRD algorithm.
The PBIRD Algorithm
The PBIRD algorithm consists of three steps. The input of the algorithm is a relational database R which consists of a target relation , a privacy relation , some background relations { } and the interconnection between these tables via joins. Recall that the data mining task we consider is classification. Here, the target relation contains the target attribute which needs to be classified and the privacy relation contains the confidential attribute that should be protected. Step 1: Two sets of join paths; one with respect to the target relation and another with respect to the privacy relation are identified. From the list of extracted join paths, the join paths with one-to-many relationships (i.e. aggregation applicable join paths) are selected, the flat files are constructed (with and without aggregation), and eventually added to the list of applicable views. A view refers to a flat file constructed via joining the relations in a given join path. The target views correspond to the applicable join paths which start at the target relation. Similarly, the privacy views correspond to the applicable join paths which start at the privacy relation.
The outcome consists of four sets:
A: target views constructed using aggregation B: target views constructed without using aggregation (for the same join paths used for set A)
Step For each of the sets (i.e. A, B, C, and D) identify their corresponding set of selected attributes {J}, {K}, {L}, {M} using CFS.
Step 3:
Identify all intersections between {J}, {K}, {L}, {M} and construct the corresponding Venn diagrams.
C: privacy views constructed using aggregation D: privacy views constructed without using aggregation (for the same join paths used for set C)
In order to show the view construction process in details, let us consider the database provided for the PKDD 2001 challenge, i.e. the Thrombosis database. This is one of the three benchmarking databases used in our work. Thrombosis is considered one of the most severe complications which arise from different collagen diseases. Studies have shown that it is strongly related to anti-cardiolipin antibodies [15] . Two classification targets have been defined for this database. The patient gender attribute in the Gender relation is considered the target attribute. The IgG concentration level attribute in the Antibody_Level relation is considered the privacy attribute. This attribute records the anti-cardiolipin antibody IgG level of the patient, indicates a personal health problem, and hence, needs to be protected [16] . For simplification purpose, the names of the relations are abbreviated (Table 1 ). [15] For this database, two sets of join paths are extracted. Since we are interested in the aggregation applicable join paths, it is necessary to identify the relations which participate in one-tomany links. In this database, these relations are, namely, Diagnosis, Thrombosis, and Ana_Pattern. We are mainly interested in join paths which contain at least one of these relations. For each of such join paths, the corresponding view is constructed twice; with and without aggregation, as follows.
Consider the PS_PN_D_AnaP join path ( Figure 3 ). Table 2,  Table 3, and Table 4 The first flat file (view) represented in Table 5 is the result of joining the relations in the join path without applying aggregation functions. The second flat file corresponds to the PS_PN_D_AnaP view constructed with aggregation and is shown in Table 6 . In our work, we use the sum, average, count, minimum and maximum aggregation functions for numerical attributes. The count aggregation function is used for binary and nominal attributes. A comparison between the flat files presented in Tables 5  and Table 6 shows the role of applying aggregation in reducing the number of records associated with patient ID = 355009, and hence, reducing the redundancy.
The information summarized over multiple records in Table  5 is represented in the newly constructed relational features in Table 6 . In this example Confirm, Diagnosis, and FromTest in the Diagnosis relation and NAN_PA in the Ana_Pattern relation are all nominal attributes. Thus, the count aggregation operator is used to perform the summarization. It follows that, when count is applied on either nominal and binary attributes, the type of the constructed features is changed into numerical and the number of rows decreases. attributes and the final result is obtained (Table 6 ). We observe that in addition to the relational features, there are other attributes in Table 6 , such as ID, Gender, Age, Admission, and DescriptionDate. These attributes are not newly constructed. They are normal attributes that belong to some of the joined relations and we shall refer to them as the original attributes, versus relational attributes, throughout this paper. Table 6 : The flat file corresponding to join path (PS_PN_D_AnaP) constructed using aggregation
Step 2: Using the Correlation-based Feature Selection (CFS) algorithm, the sets of selected attributes that are highly correlated with the target class corresponding to A and B, and the privacy class corresponding to C and D, are identified. These sets are, namely, {J}, {K}, {L}, and {M} which refer to selected attributes highly correlated to the target class corresponding to set A, B, C, and D respectively.
In general, feature subset selection refers to the process of identifying and removing redundant and irrelevant information in order to reduce the dimensionality of the data. The benefit of feature selection includes improved predictive accuracy, reduction in the amount of data which is required to perform learning, a more compact and easily understood learned knowledge, and less execution time. We employ the CFS feature selection method, which is considered one of the most efficient and scalable feature selection algorithms [17] . Further, it is one of the feature selection techniques that evaluate subsets of attributes, rather than individual attributes [17] . In our work, when constructing views, we follow a multi-view learning approach [23] . In this method, each view consists of a subset of attributes. This makes the CFS approach, a perfect candidate for our purposes. The CFS method is based on the hypothesis that, a good feature subset contains features that are highly correlated with the target class and uncorrelated to one another. The concept of correlation [18] is used to measure the dependency between attributes. The CFS algorithm determines a set of selected features (attributes) which are highly correlated with (predictive of) the class and yet not correlated to (predictive of) each others [1] . In the remaining parts of this paper, we will use the term "correlation" in this context.
The heuristic goodness of feature set or (returned by the CFS algorithm) is obtained using the following equation: = (1) Here, refers to the heuristic "merit" of a selected feature subset (selected attributes), k is the number of features in the selected subset, is the average of the correlation between the features and the class, and is the average of the intercorrelation in between features within the feature subset [1] .
Step 3: The intersections (∩) of the sets of attributes obtained in the previous step are identified. The list of all possible intersections is provided below: {J} ∩ {K}: common list of attributes (corresponding to set A, and set B) that are correlated with the target class.
{J} ∩ {L}: list of attributes that are correlated with the target class (corresponding to set A) which are also correlated with the privacy class (corresponding to set C). These attributes may lead to a privacy breach.
{J} ∩ {M}: list of attributes that are correlated with the target class (corresponding to set A) which are also correlated with the privacy class (corresponding to set D). These attributes may lead to a privacy breach.
{K} ∩ {L}: list of attributes that are correlated with the target class (corresponding to set B) which are as well correlated with the privacy class (corresponding to set C). These attributes may lead to a privacy breach.
{K} ∩ {M}: list of attributes that are correlated with the target class (corresponding to set B) which are as well correlated with the privacy class (corresponding to set D). These attributes may lead to a privacy breach.
{L} ∩ {M}: common list of attributes (corresponding to set C, and set D) that are correlated with the privacy class.
Venn diagrams are used to illustrate the possible intersections in between the different sets (refer to Figure 4) . In addition to the attributes that fall into the intersected (overlapping) sections, using the Venn diagrams, four nonoverlapping regions are also defined, namely {J'}, {K'}, {L'}, and {M'}. We discuss these regions below:
{J'} = {J} -{K}: List of attributes which are uniquely correlated to the target class (excluding the common attributes between {J} and {K}) when the target views are constructed with aggregation.
{K'} = {K} -{J}: List of attributes which are uniquely correlated to the target class (excluding the common attributes between {K} and {J}) when the target views are constructed without aggregation.
{L'} = {L} -{M}: List of attributes which are uniquely correlated to the privacy class (excluding the common attributes between {L} and {M}) when the privacy views are constructed with aggregation.
{M'} = {M} -{L}: List of attributes which are uniquely correlated to the privacy class (excluding the common attributes between {M} and {L}) when the privacy views are constructed without aggregation.
Using the list of intersections, we are able to find a set of selected attributes which are highly correlated with the target class that may lead to a privacy breach in a relational database.
The following observations highlight the main evaluation criteria when examining the Venn diagrams.
1-Having different lists of attributes in {J'} versus {K'} (or in {L'}
versus {M'}) indicates the fact that aggregation changes the set of selected attributes that are highly correlated with the classification target (either target class or privacy class) and uncorrelated to each other. 2-Even if we ignore the role of aggregation, using the logical relations in the resulting Venn diagram, we are able to identify a list of attributes that may lead to privacy leakage in the database. This refers to the list of selected attributes which are highly correlated to the target class (appear in {K}) and are correlated to the privacy class (appear in {M}) as well. The attributes in the resulting intersection {K} ∩ {M} may lead to potential privacy breach in the relational database. 3-Investigating the potential privacy breach caused by applying aggregation is achieved in the following way: we investigate the set of selected attributes which are uniquely correlated with the target class i.e. appear in {J'} and are also correlated with the privacy class i.e. appear in {L} and/or {M}. This list contains the attributes which appear in the intersections {J'} ∩ {L} and {J'} ∩ {M}, respectively. Using this list, we can identify a set of attributes in the flat file constructed with aggregation that may potentially become harmful. The list of selected features in {J'} ∩ {L} or in {J'} ∩ {M} may include both the original attributes and the relational attributes and provides us with information about the impact of either type of attributes on the privacy breach. 4-Using the Venn diagrams, we also identify the list of selected attributes in {J} ∩ {K} ∩ {L} ∩ {M}. These attributes are highly correlated with the target class and the privacy class regardless of applying aggregation functions. The attributes in this region are considered harmful attributes and need attention. 
Experimental Evaluation
In our work, we have employed the standard ten-fold cross validation method. We used MySQL in the view construction process. In order to implement CFS, the CfsSubsetEval function (the implementation of CFS algorithm in WEKA [19] ) with best-first search was employed. (WEKA is a wellknown suite of machine learning software, hosted at the University of Waikato, New Zealand). We ran all experiments on a workstation with a 2.3 GHz AMD Dual-Core CPU, and with 4 GBytes of RAM.
Databases Used
Three benchmarking databases for multi-relational classification were used. Our first database is the previously introduced Thrombosis database from the PKDD 2001 discovery challenge [15] .
Our second database was extracted from a data warehouse of a Swiss insurance company [20] . Two learning tasks i.e. Task A and Task B were included in this database [16] . Task_A classifies the partner category into 1 or 2, and Task_B classifies the household category of class positive or negative. In this database, the partner category in Task A is considered the target attribute. On the other hand, the household category in Task B indicating partners' life style choices is considered the confidential attribute. In addition to these two relations, eight other background relations were provided and were stored in Eadr, Padr, Hhold, Part, Parrol, Vvert, Tfkomp, and Tfrol tables. The third database used is a financial database which was part of the PKDD99 discovery challenge [21] . This database was offered by a Czech bank and contains typical financial data. The aim of multi-relational classification task for this database is to predict the risk of granting a personal loan to new customers. In our experiment, we used the data which was prepared by Yin et al. in [22] 
Experimental Results
The view construction process corresponding to the Thrombosis database was discussed in details in Section 3. For this database, following the PBIRD algorithm, we obtain the list of selected features in {J}, {K}, {L}, and {M} and construct the corresponding Venn diagrams ( Figure 5 ).
Consider D_diagnosis, PN_firstdate, ANAP_NAN_PA, THR_symptom, PN_age, and D_from_test. These attributes belong to the overlapping region of {J} ∩ {K} and are highly correlated with the target class either with or without applying aggregation during the flattening process. However, there are features that are correlated with the target class only when the target views are constructed with aggregation such as ANTI_ET_acl_igg, ANTI_EN_ACL_IGM, D_confirmed _count, and ANTI_EN_ANA in {J'}. Similarly, there is one selected feature i.e. THR_examination_date which appears in the {K'} list and is correlated with the target class only when the target views are constructed without aggregation.
Further investigation of features correlated with the privacy class validates this observation. Consider {L} and {M} in the Venn diagrams. In addition to the attributes that are commonly correlated with the privacy class in {L}∩{M}, i.e. ANTI_EN_exam_date, D_diagnosis, PN_firstdate, ANAP _NAN_PA, ANTI_EN_ANA, ANTI_EN_Thrombosis, and PN_admission, we are able to identify features which are correlated with the privacy class only when the privacy views are constructed with aggregation in {L'} or without aggregation in {M'}.Consider D_confirmed_count, ANTI_EN _ACL_IGA, and THR_attack_seq_num in {L'}. These attributes are highly correlated with the privacy class only when the views are constructed with aggregation. On the other hand, attributes such as THR_symptom, PN_age, D_from_test, THR_examination_date, ANTI_EN_RVVT, ANTI_EN_KCT, D_confirm, and ANTI_EN_LAC in {M'} are correlated with the privacy class when the views are constructed without applying aggregation functions.
Having different lists of attributes in {J'} versus {K'} (and similarly in {L'} versus {M'}) shows the impact of aggregation on changing these correlations. Recall from Section 3 that, aggregation results in constructing new features, the so-called relational features. As such, for a given join path, the flat file constructed with aggregation will have different attributes, compared to the flat file constructed without aggregation. When we apply the CFS algorithm on the flat file constructed with aggregation, the list of selected attributes obtained by the CFS algorithm consists of both relational and original features. This implies that, in addition to the original features, relational features also play an important role in predicting the target class. Aggregation even changes the list of original features in {J'} versus {K'} and similarly in {L'} versus {M'}. To this end, we conclude that aggregation changes the correlation of the features with the classification target (either the target class or the privacy class).
Before discussing the role of aggregation in the privacy breach of this database, we first consider the potential privacy breach in this database, in general. Consider {K} ∩ {M} which includes D_diagnosis, PN_firstdate, ANAP_NAN_PA, THR_symptom, PN_age, D_from_test and THR_examination _date. This intersection provides us with a list of features which are highly correlated with the target class and also correlated with the privacy class. These features, therefore, may lead to a potential privacy breach in the database.
In studying the effect of aggregation on the privacy of this database, we notice the following. There are five attributes that belong to the overlapping region {J} ∩ {L}. They are namely D_confirmed_count, ANTI_EN_ANA, D_diagnosis, ANAP_NAN_PA, PN_firstdate.
Out of these five attributes, two attributes i.e. D_confirmed_count and ANTI_EN_ANA are correlated with the target class only when the flat files are constructed using aggregation. These two attributes are also highly correlated with the privacy class and may potentially lead to a privacy breach in the Thrombosis database. In fact, D_confirmed_count belongs to the overlapping region of {J'} and {L'}. It implies that it is highly correlated to the privacy class when the privacy view itself is constructed using aggregation. This is an important result, which contradicts the general and unfounded belief that, if privacy is successfully enforced with non-aggregated data, it is automatically enforced with aggregated data. In the Venn diagrams, attributes that belong to {J} ∩ {K} ∩ {L} ∩ {M}, namely, D_diagnosis, PN_firstdate, and ANAP_NAN_PA are of a considerable importance. These attributes are highly correlated with the target class and may lead to privacy leakage whether the views are constructed with or without aggregation.
In this database, aggregation introduces new attributes in the set of selected features such as D_confirmed_count and ANTI_EN_ANA that may potentially become harmful and negatively impacts the privacy of the database. However, looking at the problem from a different perspective, aggregation could eventually be used as an effective tool to provide more protection for the database. Constructing the views without aggregation provides us with a list of potentially dangerous attributes in {K} ∩ {M}. In addition to this list, if we identify and protect the potentially dangerous attributes obtained as a result of applying aggregation in {J'} ∩ {L} and {J'} ∩ {M}, we indeed provide a better privacy for our database. Next, we evaluate the "merit of best subset found" (as discussed in Section 3) of the target views constructed with and without aggregation. When a given view is constructed with and without aggregation, as a result, two structurally different datasets are obtained. Although these two datasets have some common attributes, most of their attributes are distinct. Our goal is to investigate the impact of aggregation on the heuristic goodness of a feature set. The results of such a comparison are shown in Figure 6 . Recall from Equation 1 that, the heuristic goodness of feature subset depends on three factors; namely, k , , and . In discussing the Venn diagrams of Figure 5 , we noticed that aggregation changes the list of features that are highly correlated with the classification target, while being uncorrelated with one another.
Furthermore, by constructing relational features, aggregation changes the number of attributes in the constructed views. This impacts the number of components (k) in the selected subset. In general, the results show that with aggregation, better feature subsets are obtained. This thus implies that aggregation has a "positive role" in that it aids to identify features that have strong prediction ability against the classification target. These features are especially important when we investigate the potentially harmful features in the database, since they may lead to accurate privacy disclosure. Similar to the Thrombosis database, we obtain the Venn diagrams associated with the Loan and the Swiss Insurance databases. In both of these databases, with aggregation, a better "merit of best subset found" is obtained.
Discussion
In order to implement the PBIRD algorithm, we used three databases with different properties. The Thrombosis database consists of categorical attributes only, while the other two databases are mixed. In the Swiss Insurance database, the categorical attributes outnumber the numerical attributes, whereas in the Loan database, the numerical attributes outnumber the categorical attributes. Using databases with different overall data types was especially important for our work, and enabled us to study the impact of aggregation on the privacy as a function of data type. After implementing the PBIRD algorithm, we were able to identify a list of features that are highly correlated with the target class and may lead to privacy breach in the examined relational databases. These features are listed in Table 7 .
From the results presented in Table 7 , we may conclude the following. When aggregation is used, we obtain a set of harmful features which is relatively distinct from the one obtained without aggregation. In order to explain this observation, we should remind ourselves that these lists are obtained as a result of applying a feature selection algorithm on the flat files constructed with and without aggregation. Due to aggregation, the two flat files (constructed with and without aggregation) are structurally different. They have different number (and type of) of attributes, number of records, redundancy, and so on. Therefore, it is reasonable to obtain different lists of selected attributes. We also show that multi-view learning is a useful technique to detect privacy breaches in multi-relational databases. Compared to a universal flat file where relations are joined together, in multi-view learning, each view consists only of a subset of relations/attributes. By focusing solely on a subset of attributes that are presented in each view, the role of these attributes in predicting the classification target becomes especially important. Thus, we ensured that none of the attributes correlated with the classification target is ignored.
Our results indicate that there is a link between aggregation and the privacy of a relational database. We illustrate that, there are dangerous attributes obtained only when the flat files are constructed with aggregation i.e. in (J ∩ L). Thus, both join paths constructed with and without aggregation are required in order to obtain a complete set of attributes that may potentially cause harm. By providing these lists, the PBIRD algorithm allows the database designers and owners to implement necessary adjustments in order to protect the privacy of a database. For example, in addition to the confidential attributes, they may remove the potentially dangerous attributes from the database, or may use one of the existing privacy preserving techniques (Section 2) to modify these attributes. 
Conclusions and Future Work
This paper shows that there is a link between aggregation and privacy breach in relational databases. In this study, we were able to identify a list of dangerous features which were obtained only when the join paths were constructed with aggregation. Our study indicates that the general notion that "if privacy is enforced on non-aggregated relational databases tables, it is also implicitly enforced on aggregated data" does not always hold. Our method provides us with a complete set of potentially dangerous attributes (obtained with and without aggregation) which may lead to privacy breaches in a relational database. By providing this information to the database designers and owners, they are warned of the list of harmful features that may be linked to private information. Therefore, necessary adjustments may be put into place in order to protect the database. Our future work includes testing our approach on different databases with complex schema and on databases that include multiple confidential attributes residing in the same relation, or in different relations. We will also test this algorithm in the case where the target attribute and the privacy attribute coexist in the same relation and we plan to automate the process.
It follows that, with different feature selection algorithms, the obtained set of dangerous attributes might differ. This issue further deserves to be investigated. It would be worthwhile to conduct a comparative study of different categories of feature selection algorithms. Thus, we will be able to investigate the impact of different feature subset selection techniques on the privacy of relational database.
